Trade-off between credit risk and liquidity risk in different settlement systems (NET, RTGS and Hybrid)
By Othman Darwish
Introduction
According to the report prepared by the Committee on
Payment and Settlement Systems of the central banks of the Group of Ten
countries in 1997: "Settlement is the actual transfer of funds between
the payer's bank and payee's bank. Settlement discharges the obligation of the
payer bank to the payee bank in respect of the transfer. Settlement is
irrevocable and unconditional and is described as final settlement". Thus,
settlement systems are used to transfer large value payments between financial
institutions, aiming to streamline funds transfer in secure, effective and less
risk manner.
As mentioned by the Bank of Finland Studies (2005), two main
risks the participants in the settlement systems expose to; the credit risk and
liquidity risk. Credit risk takes place when a defaulted counterparty of the
payment "The Debtor" cannot meet the obligation of the full value of
the transaction either when settlement date is due or in the future. On the
other hand, the liquidity risk happened
when a counterparty will not meet the obligation of the full value of the
payment at settlement due date, but he will at some time specified later.
Settlement systems is basically classified according to the
timing (and frequency) of settlement to Net settlement systems and gross
settlement systems (RTGS). Alternative system designs (such as real-time gross
settlement systems or hybrid systems) are then increasingly being adopted to
reduce or eliminate the risks in the settlement systems, as per Kai Barvell
(2002).
The Details
This section describes the settlement systems individually,
and how the settlement risks (credit and liquidity) is being addresses by each.
NET Settlement
In NET settlement
system, the actual funds transfer (settlement ) is delayed and to take place in
net basis at predetermined intervals (usually one interval at the end of
business day). At the settlement time, all participating banks net positions
are calculated, as the summation of all the received payments values (total
credit) subtracting the summation of all the sent payments (total debit) values,
the resulted net value (net settlement position) could be either a net credit or
debit position.
The advantage of the NET settlement system is that it
increases the participants liquidity and decreasing its risk, as -
during the business day - they may be receiving credits and applying them to debit
payments (transactions sent by other participants at the same business day). On
the other hand, the NET settlement system disadvantage is that it increases the credit risk; since
at the settlement time, if any of the participating banks is defaulted, no
settlement for all payments exchanged during that interval will be executed. To
overcome this issue, the system deletes all or some of the defaulted bank
transactions, and creates new settlement net position, this operation is called unwinding, and it is not easy decision, since unwinding the
defaulted bank transactions may lead to other banks defaulting (domino effects),
which may impact the stability of the entire financial market, as per Kai
Barvell (2002).
Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS)
In the RTGS system, each individual payment instruction (Gross)
is settled at the moment it enters the
system immediately (in real time) basis, effectively the RTGS system provides
settlement finality during the business day.
RTGS system essentially eliminates credit risk since there is no delay
between the time of sending the message instruction and the time of processing
and settling that instruction, as per Antoine Martin (2005). In such system, to
meet final settlement requirement, holding high liquidity is needed in order to
meet all payments obligations in real time, this may lead to liquidity risk and
failure in meeting those obligations during a business day. However, to
mitigate the liquidity risk problem, the
RTGS system could apply rules which set how fast the execution of the payment
should be, other approach is to develop a set of payment queuing features that engaged
together in calculating the proper order of payments execution, this is to
avoid liquidly shortage and resilience flow of payments, as per Kai Barvell
(2002).
Hybrid System
Hybrid settlement system is a temp to combine the advantages
of the RTGS system (that eliminates the credit risk) and the netting system
(that decreases the liquidity risk). In order to achieve this, the hybrid
system prioritizes payments according to its urgency, it assumes a payment should
be set to either a normal payment or an urgent payment. Urgent payments are settled in gross real time,
those payments may have special
exclusive time window and participants (those that exchange transactions between
central bank and commercial banks for example), this is in order to implement
monetary policy. Normal payments will be typically hold in a central queue to
net/offset them continuously or at frequent interval against payment from other
participating banks. To an extent, the resulting net debit positions are fully
covered by the balances of the participants settlement accounts or by the incoming
credit payments, and they could be settled immediately. Those payments that
could not be settled are kept in a queue for the next cycle of netting and
settlement. At the end of the day, the remaining items will be returned to
initiating participants. Frequent netting in hybrid system aims to reduce the
liquidity needs in relative to RTGS settlement, as per Kai Barvell (2002).
Conclusion
This paper displayed a trade-off between the settlement
risks, credit and liquidity, that are addressed
differently in the different settlement systems; the Netting system decreases
the liquidity risk requirements and associated cost but increases the credit
risk, while the RTGS eliminates the credit risk, but increases the liquidity
requirements, finally, the Hybrid system tries to compromise between the liquidity and credit risks by increasing
liquidity and minimizing (not eliminating) the credit risk .
References
1.
Report prepared by the
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems of the central banks of the Group
of Ten countries (1997), REAL-TIME
GROSS SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS, Bank for International Settlements
2.
Antoine Martin (2005), Recent
Evolution of LargeValue Payment Systems: Balancing Liquidity and Risk,
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
3.
Kai Barvell (2002), Risks
and Developments in Payment Systems, The International Monetary Fund
(IMF)
4.
Bank of Finland Studies
(2005), Liquidity,
risks and speed in payment and settlement systems – a simulation approach,
E: 31 · 2005
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